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Workers' Compensation-Third-Party Tort Liability to Injured
Workers Under R.C.W. Title 51-Seattle-FirstNational Bank v.
Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wn. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
Washington's Industrial Insurance Act' immunizes employers from
tort actions brought by their injured employees. 2 Dissatisfied with the
modest compensation assured by the Act, employees often seek other
parties to sue. 3 Manufacturers who supply job-related equipment to em4
ployers are popular defendants because they are unprotected by the Act.
In Seattle-FirstNational Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co. 5 the Washington Supreme Court rendered the manufacturer's role as the employer's
cotortfeasor 6 particularly onerous. With only a cursory examination of
policy, the court interpreted the Act as immunizing employers from suits
by manufacturers for contribution, indemnity, or apportionment. 7 In re1.

WASH. REV. CODE tit. 51 (1976).

2. The statute provides in part:
[A]II phases of the premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief
for workers, injured in their work, and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except as otherwise provided in this title, and to that end all civil actions and civil causes
of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes
are hereby abolished, except as in this title provided.
WASH. REv. CODE § 51.04.010 (Supp. 1978).
The Washington Supreme Court has consistently construed this statute as giving employers immunity from their employees' tort actions. Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 90 Wn. 2d 323,
340, 582 P.2d 500, 509-10 (1978); Lehtinen v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 63 Wn. 2d 456, 457, 387 P.2d
760, 761 (1963); Latimer v. Western Mach. Exch., 42 Wn. 2d 756, 758, 259 P.2d 623, 624 (1953).
However, employee actions against employers for intentionally inflicting injury remain judicially
cognizable. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.010 (Supp. 1978).
3. O'Connell, Bargainingfor Waivers of Third-PartyTort Claims: An Answer to Product Liability Woes for Employers and Their Employees and Suppliers, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 435,440.
4. Id.
5. 91 Wn. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
6. The Seattle-Firstcourt classified multiple tortfeasors into three groups: joint tortfeasors, concurrent tortfeasors, and successive tortfeasors. Id. at 235, 588 P.2d at 1312. Joint tortfeasors breach
a joint duty or act in common, while concurrent tortfeasors breach separate duties or act independently. Id. The court characterized the harm caused by these two types of tortfeasors as indivisible,
distinguishing it from the "clearly divisible" harm caused by successive tortfeasors. Id. "The concept
of 'successive' tort-feasors applies when none of the multiple tort-feasors could have caused the
whole harm suffered ...."Id. at n.3.
7. By an action for contribution or indemnity the defendant seeks to shift the burden of liability
to a joint tortfeasor. Contribution shifts only a portion of the loss, while indemnity shifts the entire
liability. 49 WASH. L. REv. 705, 726 (1974). The right to indemnity arises in Washington as a result
of a contractual arrangement between the parties, or as a result of the nature of the parties' acts in
causing the injury. "[I]ndemnity is permitted where the indemnitor is found to have been actively
and primarily negligent, while the indemnitee was passively and secondarily negligent." Comment,
Relative Contribution Among Tortfeasors: Time for Judicial Change of the Washington Rule? 11
Gozz. L. REv. 179, 180 (1975).
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jecting the trial court's innovative attempt to reconcile competing interests, 8 the court also reaffirmed Washington's rule of joint and several liability for multiple tortfeasors. 9 The court thus deprived manufacturers of
all avenues of relief against employer-cotortfeasors and left them liable
for the employer's share of the losses as well as their own.
This note examines the historical rationale and questionable
contemporary utility of absolute employer immunity and joint and several liability. It concludes that the problem of distributing losses fairly
among injured workers, their employers, and manufacturers of job-related equipment should be solved by imposing liability according to
fault, with the employer's share of the damages deemed satisfied by his
premium payments into the industrial insurance fund.
I. THE CASE
Construction worker George Stanford died when the boom of the truck
he was unloading came in contact with a power line. Seattle-First National Bank, representing Stanford's estate, sued the truck's owner-operator, Shoreline Concrete Company, and the manufacturer of the boom,
Dico Corporation.' 0 In turn, Shoreline and Dico impleaded the decedent's employer, Batterman Engineering and Construction Company,
on theories of contribution, indemnity, and apportionment. 1 The
decedent's employer argued that Washington's Industrial Insurance Act
2
barred such actions and moved unsuccessfully for summary judgment. '
The trial court's order denying summary judgment retained the deApportionment is a prejudgment method of loss sharing which entails determining the damages
suffered by each party to an action, allocating respective degrees of responsibility according to fault.
and requiring each party to bear his proportionate share of the loss. "There is a rule that if one tortfeasor seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment between
him and the other tort-feasors, the burden of proving the apportionment is upon him." Ski Acres
Dev. Co. v. Gorman, Inc., 8 Wn. App. 775, 780, 508 P.2d 1381, 1385(1973).
8. See note 63 and accompanying text infra.
9. When joint and several liability attaches, a plaintiff may sue any one of multiple tortfeasors
and recover the entire damages, even though the defendant's participation in causing the accident
HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF TORTS
was slight compared to that of the tortfeasors not joined. W. PROSSER,
§ 47, at 296 (4th ed. 1971). See note 15 infra (description of when such liability attaches in Washington).
10. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wn. 2d 230, 232, 588 P.2d 1308,
1311 (1978). Seattle-First's complaint also prayed for judgment against "any other defendant that
might later be joined by way of third-party complaint ... who might be responsible for decedent's
death." Id. at 233, 588 P.2d at 1311. The complaint thus encompassed the manufacturer of the
boom's toggle switch (Cutler-Hammer, Inc.), whom Dico added as a third-party defendant. Unable
to determine whether Cutler had been served with process, the court assumed it was a proper party
since the issues raised by Cutler's answer were identical to the ones raised by Dico. Id. at n.2.
11. Id. at 233, 588 P.2d at 1311. See note 7 supra.
12. Id.

Third-Party Tort Liability
cedent's employer as a party to the action and instructed the jury to apportion the fault of all the parties. 13 The order limited each party's liability to its apportioned fault, 14 thus abandoning the rule of joint and several
liability. 15 The trial court effectuated the employer's immunity under the
Act, however, by stipulating that any judgment against the decedent's
employer would be satisfied by proof of industrial insurance payments.
Seattle-First argued that the trial court's order reduced the amount the
estate could recover under conventional tort principles 16 and petitioned
successfully for direct review.
13. Id.
14. Id. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act takes an approach similar in some respects to that of
the trial court. Judgments under the Act apportion the fault of all the parties and state each party's
equitable share of the loss based on that apportionment. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT §§ 2(a)(2),
2(c). While the Act retains joint and several liability, it does so with the express provision that contribution will be available to a party paying more than its equitable share without the necessity of a
separate action or a motion for a court order. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, Comment. Thus,
the trial court order and the Uniform Act both provide for apportionment of the fault and corresponding liability of all parties.
However, the Uniform Act, unlike the trial court's approach, reallocates any amount uncollectible
from one party among the remaining parties in relation to their respective percentages of fault. UNI.
FORM COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 2(d). The trial court's approach of allocating the uncollectible
employer's share of the loss to the employee appears more fair given the terms of the Industrial Insurance Act, which confer benefits on employers and employees but fail to benefit third parties. See
text accompanying notes 30-37 infra.
A solution similar to that of the Seattle-First trial court was recently proposed. Comment, Tile
Effect of Worker's CompensationLaws on the Right of a Third PartyLiable to an Injured Employee
to Recover Contribution or Indemnity from the Employer, 9 SETON HALL L. REv. 238 (1978). The
comment recommends apportioning liability according to fault, limiting the third-party's payments
to his proportioned share of the damages, and confining the employer's payments to the limits of his
workers' compensation liability. Under this scheme, the amount of the injured employee's recovery,
which depends upon the apportionment of fault, may be less than common law damages. Recognizing this, the comment explains:
It should be recognized that when the third party's proportion of the causal negligence is slight
and the employer's is relatively great, it is only fair that the employee recover less than the full
common law damages; it is merely part of the trade-off for guaranteed minimum compensation.
Only to the extent, and in the proportion, that the causal negligence lay outside the workers'
compensation system should the employee be entitled to common law damages.
Id. at 301 n.424.
15. The Washington Supreme Court first applied the doctrine of joint and several liability in
Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 710, 63 P. 572 (1901). Doremus stated the usual rule:
[W]here one has received an actionable injury at the hands of two or more persons acting in
concert, or acting independently of each other, if their acts unite in causing a single injury, all
of the wrongdoers, however numerous, are severally liable to him for the full amount of damages occasioned by such injury, and he may enforce the liability in an action against them all
jointly, or any one of the them severally, or against any number of them less than the whole.
Id. at 713-14, 63 P. at 573. Subsequent cases strictly adhere to this rule. E.g., Young v. Dille, 127
Wash. 398, 220 P. 782 (1923); Thoresen v. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 73 Wash. 99, 131 P.
645 (1913); Rauscher v. Halstead, 16 Wn. App. 599, 577 P.2d 1324 (1976).
16. Under conventional tort principles, the estate could recover all of the decedent's losses except those attributable to his negligence. In effect the trial court order required an additional exception. The estate could not recover an amount proportional to the employer's share of the fault from
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The Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in purporting to abolish joint and several liability. 17 Citing the policy of assuring full compensation to tort victims,

18

the court reversed the order limit-

ing each tortfeasor's liability to its apportioned fault. 19 The court also
held that under the Industrial Insurance Act courts have no jurisdiction
over tort actions necessarily involving employers' conduct in relation to
their employees, 20 and that the trial court should therefore have granted
the decedent's employer's motion for summary judgment. To justify absolute employer immunity from cotortfeasor suits, the supreme court re2
ferred to, but failed to identify, "strong public policy." '
II. BACKGROUND
Shortly before the Seattle-First decision, the Washington Supreme
any of the other defendants and was barred from collecting it directly from the employer by the
Washington Industrial Insurance Act.
17. 91 Wn. 2d at 239, 588 P.2d at 1314 (6-3 decision). Three matters discussed in the SeattleFirst opinion are outside the scope of this note. First, the court held that the due process and equal
protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions are not violated by employers' immunity under the Act. Id. at 244, 588 P.2d at 1317. See, Comment, supra note 14. at 291-97 (discussion of
Seattle-First'sconstitutional questions). Second, Shoreline asserted an indemnity claim based on an
independent duty of due care owed to it by the decedent's employer. The court declined to consider
this claim because Shoreline failed to argue the source of the independent duty either at trial or on
appeal. Id. at 243, 588 P.2d at 1317. Third, although Seattle-First and Shoreline raised the question
whether a plaintiff's conduct should be a damage-reducing factor in strict liability actions, the court
dispensed with this issue on procedural grounds without reaching the merits. Id. at 240, 588 P.2d at
1315. See Albrecht v. Groat, 91 Wn. 2d 257, 588 P.2d 229 (1978) (discussion of plaintiff's conduct
as damage-reducing factor in strict liability cases).
18. 91 Wn. 2d at 236, 588 P.2d at 1312.
19. Id. at 239, 588 P.2d at 1314.
20. Id. at 242, 588 P.2d at 1316 (citing WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.04.010. .32.010 (Supp. 1978)).
See note 2 supra (pertinent portions of WASH. REv. CODE § 51.04.010). WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.010 (Supp. 1978) provides in part:
Each worker injured in the course of his or her employment, or his or her family or dependents
in case of death of the worker, shall receive compensation in accordance with this chapter, and.
except as in this title otherwise provided, such payment shall be in lieu of any and all rights of
action whatsoever against any person whomsoever ....
The majority implied that this holding was merely an application of stare decisis. 91 Wn. 2d at
241-42, 588 P.2d at 1316 (1978). However, Justice Hicks. in partial dissent, noted that the dicta
relied on appeared in fundamentally distinguishable cases:
The majority states: "[wle have consistently held that when an employer, such as Batterman.
pays its industrial insurance premiums pursuant to the Act the employer may no longer be
looked to for recourse." To support this statement the majority cites several cases from this
court .... The cases from this court hold only that the employee (family or dependents), may
not look to the employer for recourse. These cases do not address the issue of third party claims
against the employer.
Id. at 246, 588 P.2d at 1318 (emphasis in original).
21. Id. at 244, 588 P.2d at 1317.
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Court decided Davis v. Niagara Machine Co., 2 2 a factually similar
case. 23 Although the Davis court expressly refused to decide whether the
Industrial Insurance Act barred all third-party indemnity actions against
employers, 24 it questioned the fairness of the rule denying third-party relief and encouraged legislative review of that rule. 25 Only months later
the majority in Seattle-Firstindicated that "strong public policy and historical reasons justify the legislative restriction of such third-party actions
against employers. ' 26 The Seattle-Firstcourt, however, failed to examine the conflicting policies involved.
The Davis court recognized the need for reconsideration of the policies
underlying the conflict between employers, who claim absolute immunity from tort suits, and manufacturers, who criticize the effects of that
immunity. 27 In recent years major developments have metamorphosed
tort law generally. 28 As a result, some of the historical justifications for
absolute employer immunity and for unwavering adherence to the rule of
29
joint and several liability have been eroded.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS
Workers' CompensationActs as a Basis for Denying Third-Party
Relief

Workers' compensation is a legislatively mandated exchange between
22. 90 Wn. 2d 342, 581 P.2d 1344 (1978).
23. In Davis, an injured employee who applied for and received workers' compensation sued the
manufacturer of the machine involved in his accident. The manufacturer filed an indemnity claim
against the employer, alleging that the employer's failure to install a guard caused the injury. The
trial court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment and the Washington Supreme Court
affirmed. Id. at 343, 581 P.2d at 1345.
24. The court dismissed the manufacturer's claim for failure to establish a recognized ground for
indemnity. Id. at 348, 581 P.2d at 1348.
25. [I]f the substantial measure of fault lies with the employer, should the third party be compelled to shoulder the entire burden of damages because of RCW Title 51, or should some more
equitable result be reached? This question raises policy issues that could be beneficially considered by the legislature in light of the goals of the entire industrial insurance scheme.
Id. at 349, 581 P.2d at 1348.
26. 91 Wn. 2d at 244, 588 P.2d at 1317. Factual differences in the cases may explain the majority's shift from a posture questioning the denial of relief for manufacturers to one endorsing it. Facts
surrounding Stanford's death are sketchy. Information from the appellate briefs casts little light on
the role each party played in causing the accident. In Davis, however, a detailed record reveals a
relatively blameless manufacturer pitted against an employer in blatant violation of safety regulations
and blind to both the manufacturer's warnings and its own history of serious accidents. 90 Wn. 2d
342, 344, 581 P.2d 1344, 1346 (1978).
27. See note 25 supra.
28. See notes 39-40 and accompanying text infra.
29. See notes 41-45 and 48-50 and accompanying text infra.
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workers and their employers. 30 In return for limited, assured relief, injured workers surrender their right to tort recoveries from their employers. 3 1 In addition to this tort immunity, employers sometimes receive
32
subrogation rights.
30. Early in the twentieth century, the number of industrial accidents increased rapidly. See H.
M. SOMERS & A. R. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 7-9 (1954). Injured workers faced many
hurdles to tort recovery. Their employers' obligations towards them were few in number and limited
in scope. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 80 at 525. In addition, employers had three potent defenses
available to them: contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule. Id. at
526. As a result, injured workers often went uncompensated for their losses. From 70 to 94 percent
of injured workers received no compensation for their losses. Id. at 530 n.32.
Recognizing that industrial injuries are an inevitable adjunct to progress, state legislatures
eventually passed workers' compensation acts. The lack of federal action in this area has been attributed to "early apparent constitutional restraints." Ream, Workmen's Compensation-U.S.A.. PROCEEDINGSOF THE INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON REHABILITATION PROGRAMS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND

RELATED FIELDS 23, 23 (1969). A restrictive interpretation of the commerce clause defeated early attempts to achieve national uniformity in workers' compensation laws, but the movement to
accomplish this goal continues in recent times. See generally Benson, Impact of Proposed National
Workers' Compensation Acts on Ohio Workmen's Compensation Law, 4 OHIO N. U.L. REV. 249.
270-78 (1977). National workers' compensation acts were introduced during the 93d. 94th. and 95th
congressional sessions, but none of these acts met with success. H.R. 8771, 93d. Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); S. 2008, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 2018, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); H.R. 9431.
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 3060, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
31. Workers' compensation "is in the nature of a compromise, by which the workman is to accept a limited compensation, usually less than the estimate which a jury might place upon his damages, in return for an extended liability of the employer, and an assurance that he will be paid." W.
PROSSER, supra note 9, § 80 at 531. Regardless of fault, the employer is liable for on-the-job injuries,
even if they are unavoidable or caused by the worker's own negligence. "The three wicked sisters of
the common law--contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule-are abolished as defenses." Id.
In Washington an injured worker receives relief "regardless of questions of fault." WASH. RE.
CODE § 51.04.010 (Supp. 1978). The Washington Department of Labor and Industries classifies
employers in relation to the hazards involved in their industries and assesses rates of payment into
the accident and medical aid fund accordingly. Id. § 51.16.035. Employers secure the payment of
compensation either by maintaining insurance or by qualifying as self-insurers. Id. § 51.14.010. The
amount of the payments injured workers receive is statutorily determined. Id. ch. 51.32.
32. In Washington an injured worker may elect to seek damages from a third person "not in the
same employ" without forfeiting his right to compensation under the Act. Id. §§ 51.24.030. .040.
The worker's election not to do so "operates as an assignment of the cause of action to the department or self-insurer, which may prosecute or compromise the action in its discretion in the name of
the injured worker, beneficiary or legal representative." Id. §51.24.050.
Distribution of awards or settlements obtained in such suits are governed by statute:
(1) In an action by the injured worker or beneficiary against the third person, any award or
settlement shall be distributed as follows:
(a) The costs and reasonable attorneys' fees shall be paid;
(b) The injured worker or beneficiary shall be paid twenty-five percent of the balance of the
award: Provided, that in the event of a compromise and settlement by the parties, the injured
worker or beneficiary may agree to a sum less than twenty-five percent;
(c) The department or self-insurer shall be paid the balance of the award, but only to the extent necessary to reimburse the department or self-insurer for compensation or benefits paid;
(d) Any remaining balance shall be paid to the injured worker or beneficiary;
(e) Thereafter no payment shall be made to or on behalf of a worker or beneficiary by the

Third-Party Tort Liability
From its inception, Washington's Industrial Insurance Act has permitted injured workers to sue parties other than their employers or fellow
workers. 33 Through legislative amendment and judicial interpretation,
the number of parties subject to such suits increased. 3 4 Although the Act
currently permits workers to seek recovery from non-coworkers whose
negligence or wrong contributes to the injury,3 5 it does not expressly address the matter of third-party actions against employers. Thus, unlike
workers and employers, 3 6 third parties gained nothing from the terms of
the Act, and through judicial interpretation they lost whatever ability
they previously had to share losses with negligent employers. 37 This apparent inequity is grounded upon the theory that third-party actions
against employers constitute indirect suits by injured employees and thus
38
upset the balance struck by the legislature.
department or self-insurer for such injury until the amount of any further compensation or benefits shall equal any such remaining balance. Thereafter, such benefits shall be paid by the
department or self-insurer to or on behalf of the worker or beneficiary as though no third party
person claim had been made.
(2) The award or settlement shall be subject to a lien by the department or self-insurer for its
share under this section.
Id. § 51.24.060. This statute diverts part of the injured employee's recovery from the third party to
the state or self-insured fund. Thus, manufacturers indirectly subsidize these funds, enabling employers to pay lower premiums. As a result, employers may completely escape the economic consequences of accidents for which they may be largely responsible.
33. The original Act permitted the worker to sue non-coworkers whose negligence or wrong doing contributed to the injury only if it occurred away from the employer's plant. Act of Mar. 7,
1911, ch. 74, 1911 Wash. Laws 345 (1911).
34. In 1927 the Act was amended to delete the language requiring that the injury occur away
from the employer's plant. Ch. 310, 1927 Wash. Laws § 2 at 816; see note 33 supra. However, in
1929 a provision was added prohibiting workers from suing any employer or worker under the Act
who, at the time of the accident, was engaged in extrahazardous employment. Ch. 132, 1929 Wash.
Laws § 1 at 326. This approach has been characterized as "the most sweeping attempt to extend the
workers' compensation immunity to third parties." O'Connell, supra note 3, at 454. However, the
judiciary narrowly construed this provision. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OFWORKMAN'S COMPENSATION §
72.40, at 14-92 n.47 (1976) (citing as examples, Pennsylvania Salt Mfg. Co. v. Haynes, 184 F.2d
355 (9th Cir. 1950), which relied on Gephart v. Stout, I1 Wn. 2d 184, 118 P.2d 801 (1941);Lunday
v. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 200 Wash. 620, 94 P.2d 744 (1939); and Pryor v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
196 Wash. 382, 83 P.2d 241 (1938)). Eventually the legislature abandoned this approach. Ch. 70,
1957 Wash. Laws § 23, at 279. See 2A A. LARSON, supra, at 14-92 to 93.
35. WASH. REv. CODE § 51.24.030 (Supp. 1978) provides: "If the injury to a worker is due to the
negligence or wrong of a third person not in the same employ, the injured worker or beneficiary may
elect to seek damages from the third person."
36. One scholar praised workers' compensation acts for the benefits accorded to workers and
employers. He observed that the acts provide injured workers with immediate relief, eliminate expensive and burdensome litigation, reduce friction between the worker and his boss, and result in
more harmonious industrial relations than were possible previously. 1 W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 1, at 6 (2d ed. 1932).
37. The position of third parties has been characterized as one of "all sacrifice and no corresponding gain." LARSON, supra note 34, § 76.52 at 14-407.
38. Professor Larson challenges this theory by pointing out that two benefits derive from permitting third parties, such as manufacturers, to recover against employers. First, employees' common
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Washington's judicial adoption of strict liability39 and legislative enactment of comparative negligence 40 have so exacerbated the unfairness
of the manufacturer's position that sustaining the legislative balance at
his expense has become difficult to justify. The advent of strict liability
increased the manufacturer's exposure to workers' claims, "thereby accentuating the harshness of a denial of any relief."' 4 1 Similarly, the abolition of contributory negligence, which accompanied enactment of
Washington's comparative negligence statute, 42 "ensure[d] that the third
43
party w[ould] be held liable with far greater frequency."
These changes in Washington tort law strengthen third-party arguments for relief. Relieving manufacturers of the employers' share of the
losses is compatible with the policy underlying comparative negligence-apportioning liability according to fault. 44 Also, the rule of strict
liability weakens distinctions between employers, who are absolutely liable under the Industrial Insurance Act, and manufacturers, whose
45
liability formerly was based solely on fault.
B.

Joint and Several Liability as a Basis for Denying Third-Part),
Relief

The Washington Supreme Court adopted the rule of joint and several
liability without analyzing it. 46 The court's early opinions offer little aslaw rights against negligent outsiders are preserved. Second, the rights of outsiders and negligent
employers are adjusted in an arguably fair manner. According to Professor Larson, the first benefit is
relevant to the purposes of workers' compensation acts, while the second is independent of them. Id.
at 14-406.
39. Albrecht v. Groat, 91 Wn. 2d 257, 588 P.2d 229 (1978); Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co.. 89
Wn. 2d 149, 570 P.2d 438 (1977).
40. The statute provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages caused by negligence resulting in death or in injury to person
or property, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the percentage of
negligence attributable to the party recovering.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010 (1976).
41. Comment, New PoliciesBearing on the Negligent Employer's Immunity from Loss-Sharing.
29 ME. L. REV. 243, 250 (1978).
42. See note 40 supra.
43. Comment, supra note 41.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. The Washington Supreme Court first adopted joint and several liability in Doremus v. Root,
23 Wash. 710, 63 P. 532 (1901). See note 15 supra. It attempted no analysis of the rule and offered
no policy reasons in support of it.
Joint and several liability originated in Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep.
1337 (K.B. 1799). W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 50 at 305. The doctrine developed in Merriyweather
enabled a tort victim to select his defendants, while precluding contribution suits against those tort-
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sistance in determining the rationale for the rule. 47 The Seattle-First
court justified imposition of entire liability on an involuntary and independent actor on the basis of the indivisible nature of the injury and the
policy of assuring full compensation to tort victims. 48 In the industrial
injury setting, these justifications lack merit.
Washington's adoption of the rule of comparative negligence has undermined the notion that the harm caused by joint tortfeasors is indivisible. Other jurisdictions have recognized that a jury which is capable of
apportioning fault between plaintiff and defendant should also be able to
allocate fault among several defendants. 49 This recognition led one state
supreme court to characterize joint and several liability as "obviously
50
inconsistent with the equitable principles of comparative negligence."
The Seattle-Firstcourt rejected the contention that comparative negligence, as applied in Washington, is inconsistent with joint and several
liability. 5 1 The court supported its position by explaining that generally
the culpability of plaintiffs differs from that of defendants, 52 and that the
indivisibility of injuries is unaffected by the feasibility of apportioning
fault. 53 To support the double standard it applied to plaintiffs and defenfeasors whom he opted not to sue. American jurisdictions initially applied the rule against contribution only to cases involving intentional wrongdoers. Id.
47. See, e.g., Fleming v. Red Top Cab Co., 133 Wash. 338, 233 P. 639 (1925); Knudson v.
Bockwinkle, 120 Wash. 527, 208 P. 59 (1922); Thoresen v. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 73
Wash. 99, 131 P. 645 (1913).
48. 91 Wn.2d at 236, 588 P.2d at 1312.
49. See, e.g., Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d 530, 535-36 (Ky. 1974); Laubach v. Morgan, 588
P.2d 1071, 1075 (Okla. 1978).
50. Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Okla. 1978). The Laubach court further commented that the "principle of entire liability" involved in joint and several liability was "of
questionable soundness under a comparative system where a jury determines the precise amount of
fault attributable to each party." Id. at 1074. The Oklahoma Supreme Court therefore abolished joint
and several liability in order to "augment Oklahoma's statutory scheme to meet the intent and underlying principle of comparative negligence." Id. at 1075.
51. 91 Wn. 2d at 238, 588 P.2d at 1314. The court insisted that "from the perspective of the
recovery rights of the injured party, comparative negligence and the suggested abolition of joint and
several liability are completely inconsistent." Id. at 236-37, 588 P.2d at 1313. By limiting its perspective to only one of several competing interests, the court precluded broad-based analysis. The
Seattle-Firstcourt identified four states that legislatively modified the rule ofjoint and several liability at the time they enacted comparative negligence statutes. Apparently these states failed either to
accept or to discern the inconsistency the court detected. See id. at 237, 588 P.2d at 1313 (citing
statutes of Kansas, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Nevada).
52. "A plaintiff's negligence relates to a failure to use due carefor his own protection whereas a
defendant's negligence relates to a failure to use due care for the safety of others." Therefore, the
defendant's conduct is tortious but the plaintiff's is not. Id. at 238, 588 P.2d at 1314 (emphasis in
original).
53. "The simple feasibility of apportioning fault on a comparative negligence basis, between
plaintiff and defendant, does not render an indivisible injury 'divisible' for purposes of joint and
several liability." Id. at 237, 588 P.2d at 1313 (emphasis in original),.
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54
dants, the court cited Prosser's discussion of contributory negligence.
In that discussion, however, Prosser questioned the desirability of
outright recognition of this double standard, the utility of which he attri55
buted to softening the harshness of the contributory negligence defense.
Recognition of this double standard is of dubious wisdom where the contributory negligence defense has been abolished, especially in light of the
growing number of situations in which a plaintiff's negligence threatens
56
others as well as himself.
The comparative negligence system in Washington currently permits
an injured worker who was 40% at fault to recover 60% of his damages
from a manufacturer who was only 10% at fault, even though the employer was 50% at fault. 57 The Seattle-Firstcourt's failure to remedy this
inequitable situation is not justified by its fear of faultless plaintiffs being
denied the recovery otherwise assured under the doctrine of joint and
several liability. Under the trial court's approach in Seattle-First, the employee retains both his statutory compensation and his right of action
against the manufacturer. 58 Deleting from his recovery the damages attributable to the employer's fault deprives the employee merely of some59
thing he already statutorily surrendered.
The Washington Supreme Court has the power to modify the judicially-devised doctrine of joint and several liability. 60 Tort law
54. Id. at 238, 588 P.2d at 1314 (citing to W. PROSSER, supra note 9. § 65).
55. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 65 at 420.
56. Such situations naturally become more common as industrialization and increased automobile use continue.
57. The Washington Supreme Court has recognized the inequity of burdening relatively blameless manufacturers with liability exceeding their proportionate share of the blame. See notes 25-26
and accompanying text supra.
58. To protect plaintiffs not covered by Washington's Industrial Insurance Act, the Washington
Supreme Court could limit abolition of the joint and several liability doctrine to cases involving covered workers who sue third parties.
59. See Comment, supra note 14, at 301. An alternative solution that would allay fears of
injured workers bereft of recoveries is retaining joint and several liability while permitting third parties to seek contribution from employers. This solution requires reversal of the long-standing Washington rule against contribution. See Wenatchee Wenoka v. Krack Corp., 89 Wn. 2d 847. 576 P.2d
388 (1978); Comment, supra note 7, at 179-82. It would also require reinterpretation of R.C.W. §
51.04.010. Permitting contribution differs significantly from the approach of the Seattle-First trial
court. For example, in a case involving an employer 50% at fault, a worker 40% at fault, and a
manufacturer 10% at fault, if joint and several liability is retained and contribution permitted. the
worker recovers 60% of his losses and the employer pays 50% of the damages. Under the SeattleFirst trial court's approach, the worker would recover 10% and the employer would pay nothing.
The latter result is more compatible with the policy of workers' compensation statutes.
60. "In seeking to change a court-made rule, the Washington court can look to a line of decisions which have considered the common law to be very flexible." Comment, supra note 7. at 197.
Flexibility in the common law is fostered also by R.C.W. § 4.04.010, which provides in part thatthe
common law prevails "so far as it is not .. .incompatible with the institutions and conditions of
society in this state ....
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traditionally has depended on the judiciary for its adaptation to economic
and technological changes in society. This has been especially true in
Washington, where the courts typically have been attuned to progressive
developments in the law of torts. 61 The Washington Supreme Court is the
only forum practically available to third parties whose liability to injured
62
workers far exceeds their proportionate share of the blame.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Joint and several liability coupled with employer immunity from cotortfeasor suits works special hardships on manufacturers. In balancing
the interests of all the parties involved, the Seattle-Firsttrial court sought
to reconcile the policy of apportioning losses according to fault with the
Industrial Insurance Act's rule of employer immunity. It devised a solution which preserves employer immunity, permits workers to receive
compensation beyond that provided by the Act, and requires manufactur61. See, e.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wn. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975)
(extending strict liability to retailers); Godfrey v. State, 84 Wn. 2d 959, 530 P.2d 630 (1975) (applying the comparative negligence statute retroactively); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wn. 2d 522, 452
P.2d 729 (1969) (formally recognizing strict liability for manufacturers).
62. The Seattle-Firstcourt maintained that change, if it is to occur, should come from the legislature. 91 Wn. 2d at 236-37, 588 P.2d at 1313. Some commentators favor a legislative approach.
E.g., 2A LARSON, supranote 34, § 76.53 at 14-407. Others, criticizing the undue delay and the compromises inherent in legislative action, do not. See, e.g., O'Connell, supranote 3, at 445 n.45. Thus
far, the Washington Legislature's attempts to respond to this problem have proved unavailing. Although a number of bills dealing either directly or indirectly with the third-party problem have been
introduced, none have passed. See, e.g., S. 2774, 46th Wash. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1977) (engrossed
bill); H.R. 11622 45th Wash. Leg., 1st Ex. Sess. (1977) (substitute bill); H.R. 843, 46th Wash.
Leg., Reg. Sess. (1979); S. 2333, 46th Wash. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1979) (second substitute bill).
A bill that recently passed the Washington Senate would have dramatically altered the allocation
of losses among injured workers, employers, and manufacturers. S. 2333, 46th Wash. Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1979) (engrossed bill). The bill died in the Senate Rules Committee. With a few exceptions
the bill limited each party's liability to their apportioned fault. Id. at § 2(3). It imposed liability on
one party for payment of another's equitable share of the damages only when the parties acted in
concert, when a relationship justifying vicarious liability existed, when such liability was imposed
by statute, or when insolvency rendered an award uncollectible. Id. at § 2(4)-(5).
The bill provided manufacturers sued by injured workers with two possible avenues of relief.
First, it permitted joinder of "[a]ny person whose fault was a cause of the claimant's damage.., for
the purpose of assessing that person's percentage of fault." Id. at § 2(b). Persons immune from liability-if joined-were expressly included in the process of apportioning damages and fault. Id.
Second, the bill gave liable parties a right to contribution or indemnity from "any person whose
fault caused claimant's damages if that person was not allocated a percentage of fault." Id. at § 4.
The bill also permitted a liable party to seek indemnity or contribution if he had been held responsible for another person's fault by virtue of the exceptions mentioned above. Id. In addition, the bill
removed the tort immunity of an employer who, "with wilful disregard of the safety of the employee, intentionally removes, permits to be removed or fails to install permanent safety features or
devices recommended by the manufacturer who supplied the product, or required by law for the particular product, causing injury or death." Id. § 13.
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ers to bear only that portion of the loss for which they are responsible. 63
By affirming the trial court decision, the supreme court would have
embraced a solution reflecting the interests of all the parties involved.
Such an approach is not unprecedented. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has held that a third-party's liability to an injured worker
covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act 64 is limited to
its apportioned fault. 65 That court pointed to the protection afforded the
injured longshoreman by the compensation system and to his ability to
recover from the third party damages proportional to its fault. 66 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that "[firom the longshoreman's point of view,
this is not a harsh result." 67 Nor would it be a harsh result for employees
covered by Washington's Industrial Insurance Act.
Chetyl A. Johnson

63. The trial court's solution thus addresses all the considerations which one commentator delineated as essential: "(1) The employer's right to limited liability; (2) The third party's right to pay
only for its own negligence; and (3) The employee's right to limited compensation from the
employer, and to common law damages from the third party." See Comment, supra note 14. at 300.
64. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
65. Edmonds v. Campagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153. 1154 (4th Cir. 1978).
66. Id. at 1156.
67. Id.

